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Travis Johnson* Child Pornography in Canada and the
United States: The Myth of Right Answers
Child pornography is an increasing worldwide concern and is one of the most
active fronts in the ongoing battle between freedom of expression and public
safety and morality. In 2005, the child pornography provisions of the Canadian
Criminal Code were amended in response to the controversial decision of the
Supreme Court in R. v. Sharpe. Similar legislative response has occurred in the
United States following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition. A comparative examination of the legislative and judicial treatments of
the issue of child pornography in these countries reveals that despite reaching
differing rights-balancing positions, the debate in both nations revolves around
similar points. Further to this analysis, the difficult issue of child pornography
is used as an example of how a theory of rights involving judicial review as
championed by Ronald Dworkin, may be preferable to a democratic foundation
of rights as suggested by authors such as Jeremy Waldron.
La pornographie juvdnile est un probl~me en progression constante dans le
monde entier et c'est 'un des champs de bataille les plus actifs oD s'affrontent la
liberte d'expression, la s~curit6 publique et la moralits. En 2005, les dispositions
du Code criminel canadien sur la pornographie juv6nile ont 6t6 modifi6es
en r6action j I'arr~t controvers6 de la Cour supreme dans R. c. Sharpe. Une
r6ponse similaire a 6t6 donn6e aux E-tats-Unis . la suite de la d6cision de la Cour
supreme de ce pays dans Iaffaire Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Une etude
comparative du traitement I6gislatif et du traitement judiciaire de la question de
pornographie juvenile dans les deux pays montre que le d6bat tourne autour des
m~mes points, malgr6 le fait qu'ils soient arrives a des positions diff~rentes pour
ce qui est de I'quilibre entre les droits. A la suite de cette analyse, la difficile
question de la pornographie juvenile est utilis6e comme exemple de la fagon
dont une theorie des droits comportant un examen judiciaire, telle que la defend
Ronald Dworkin, peut 6tre pr~f6rable j une fondation d6mocratique des droits
comme le suggerent des auteurs comme Jeremy Waldron.
*B.A. (University of Calgary), LL.B. (Dalhousie), Student-at-Law, Crown Law Office Criminal,
Toronto. The author would particularly like to thank Ronalda Murphy for her assistance and advice.
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Introduction
The rise of the Internet has increased the public awareness, and likely
also the prevalence, of many forms of "expression" (written, visual, and
otherwise) that society at large would consider immoral. One of the most
prominent is child pornography, the control of which is now an issue of
worldwide concern.' In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed
the issue in R. v. Sharpe [Sharpe (S.C.C.)], where the majority read in
exceptions to Criminal Code provisions dealing with child pornography.2
Parliament has since responded with Bill C-2, An Act to Amend the
Criminal Code (protection of children and other vulnerable persons)
1. See, e.g., the preamble to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, entered into force 18 January 2002,
online: <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/opsc.htm>; ratified by U.S. 23 December
2002, online: <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/status-opsc.htm>; ratified by Canada
14 September 2005, online: <http://www.justice. gc.ca/en/news/fs/2005/doc_31622.html>.
2. R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 [Sharpe (S.C.C.)].
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and the Canada Evidence Act (see Appendix I). These amendments were
published in the Canada Gazette on 19 September 2005 and the new
provisions, to the extent they vary from those considered in the Sharpe
(S. C. C.) decision, are likely to give rise to a constitutional challenge under,
among other possible grounds, the Charter protection for freedom of
expression. Child pornography has also recently come before the Supreme
Court of the United States in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition [Ashcroft].
In that case, the U.S. Court struck for overbreadth federal laws prohibiting
the possession of child pornography.3 In the U.S. as well, Congress has
responded with constitutionally questionable legislation. 4
Child pornography pushes the furthest boundaries of the principle of
freedom of expression, as such content tends to fall outside almost any
argument for the value of protecting what individuals wish to write, say,
or draw. Many nations are thus struggling with the extent to which child
pornography deserves protection on freedom of expression grounds, and
the result reveals much about how limits on free speech can and should
be justified. Canada and the United States provide useful examples in
this respect. Both have broad, constitutionally entrenched protections for
freedom of expression and a tradition of strong judicial review on the
issue of free speech. However, the United States and Canadian Supreme
Courts have set very different limits for child pornography possession
offences. The United States has drawn a more or less solid, well-defined
line requiring restrictions on free speech to have a direct connection with
abuse of actual children. In Canada, the Supreme Court has allowed much
broader possession offences, which include works of the imagination such
as writing, to pass constitutional scrutiny.
Comparing possession offences in the United States and Canada
illuminates this interesting difference. More importantly, in undertaking
this comparison I seek to establish several arguments. Foundationally,
both the Parliament of Canada and the United States Congress are pushing
for a greater emphasis on the protection of children over the protection of
freedom of expression, and both consider the same spectrum of arguments
for and against prohibiting possession of child pornography in balancing
these values. Further, the response of the respective Supreme Courts to
child pornography offences reveals a significant and substantial difference
in the conception of harm caused by child pornography.
3. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) [Ashcroft].
4. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003
[PROTECTAct], Pub.L. 108-2 1, Apr. 30, 2003, 117 Stat. 650. Note particularly: 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256
(8)(B), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256 (11), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(c)(2) as well as the entirely new provision, 18
U.S.C.A. § 1466A. Very minor changes were made to 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(b)(l) by the Adam Walsh
Child Protection Act, 2006, Pub. L. 109-248. See also note 107.
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In considering these differences, the issue of child pornography can be
used as an example of the myth of right answers on issues of constitutional
rights, a concept that has been prominently advanced by Jeremy Waldron.'
In both the United States and Canada there has been competition between
legislative and judicial decision-makers regarding the appropriate limits
of freedom of expression, with differences of opinion amongst the
judges and between courts and legislatures. These differences, and the
inter-jurisdictional variations between Canada and the United States, are
instructive of the variable nature of the meaning of rights.
Having established that there is no right answer, in a theoretical
sense, to the rights-balancing dilemma posed by child pornography, I will
compare Waldron's theory, that legislatures are best positioned to determine
the extent of fundamental rights, with the argument of Ronald Dworkin,
that such decisions should be made through a principled balancing of
constitutional rights conducted by judges. The conclusion to be drawn is
that Waldron's view is weakened in a context such as child pornography,
and that such situations require a principled approach to constitutional
rights balancing conducted by judges.
The history of child pornography possession law in Canada will be
outlined in detail to show that there is a legislative push for a greater
emphasis on protecting children in this country. Similarly, an overview
of the history and status of child pornography possession in the United
States will demonstrate a similar situation. The various arguments in
balancing freedom of expression and the protection of children will be
compared as they are advanced in each jurisdiction. In considering the
differing positions of legislatures and courts in Canada, it is necessary
to address dialogue theory, which I will decline to apply in the current
discussion, preferring to treat judicial rights decisions as definitive. Within
this context, the theories of Waldron and Dworkin will be applied to the
child pornography example.
I. Canada
1. The Sharpe case
Provisions addressing child pornography were added to the Criminal
Code in 1993.6 In 1999, this legislation was challenged by Mr. John Robin
Sharpe as violating his rights of freedom of expression, s.2(b), and liberty,
5. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) [Waldron, Disagree-
ment].
6. See Appendix I.
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s.7, of the Charter.7 In R. v. Sharpe, Shaw J. of the B.C. Supreme Court
struck down s.163.1, and three justices of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, writing separately, upheld this decision 2-1.8 The Supreme Court of
Canada allowed the Crown appeal. 9 The conclusion in the Supreme Court
was that s. 163.1 (1993) "incidentally" created potential circumstances of
constitutional inconsistency, which was remedied by "reading in" two
exceptions to the definition of child pornography for "(1) any written
material or visual representation created by the accused alone and held by
the accused alone, exclusively for his or her own personal use; and (2) any
visual recording, created by or depicting the accused, provided it does not
depict unlawful sexual activity and is held by the accused exclusively for
private use."' The Supreme Court also indicated that the defences to the
child pornography offences (s. 163.1 (6)(1993)), including the important
"artistic merit" defence, should be interpreted liberally." Following this
decision, Mr. Sharpe's case returned to trial, and he was acquitted of
several charges. 2 The trial of Mr. Sharpe has importance in Canada due
to its particularly negative reception, and the flurry of legislative response
it provoked.
2. Legislative response to Sharpe
Unsuccessful amendments to s.163.1(1993) were advanced in Bill C-
20 and Bill C-12. 3 These were more or less direct responses to the
government's concern with the ultimate outcome of the second Sharpe
trial.'4 In the speech from the throne on 5 October 2004, Prime Minister
Martin promised that his government would table legislation to, among
other things, "crack down on child pornography."' 5 The first bill tabled by
7. R. v. Sharpe (1999), 169 D.L.R. (4th) 536, 22 C.R. (5th) 129 (B.C.S.C.) [Sharpe (B.C.S.C.
1999)].
8. Ibid.; R. v. Sharpe, 1999 B.C.C.A. 416, 175 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Sharpe (B.C.CA.)].
9. Sharpe (S. CC), supra note 2 at 243.
10. Ibid. at para. 129. The case is important beyond its subject matter as a precedent for the
constitutional remedy of "reading in."
11. Ibid. at para. 128.
12. R. v. Sharpe, 2002 B.C.S.C. 423,54 W.C.B. (2d) 474 [Sharpe (B.C.S.C. 2002)].
13. Bill C-20 was tabled in December 2002, was considered in committee, and was reported to
the House of Commons in October 2003 with amendments. However, the Bill died with that
Parliamentary session: Bill C-20, 37" Parliament, 2 1d Session, online: <http://www.2.parl.gc.ca/
HouseBills/BillsGovemment.aspz?Language=E&Mode=l&Parl=37&Ses=2#C20>. The text of C-
20, as amended, was re-introduced in February 2004 as Bill C-12, which passed in the House of
Commons and was read in the Senate before the dissolution of Parliament on May 23, 2004, when a
Federal election was called: Bill C-12, 3 7 1 Parliament, 311 Session, online: <http://222.2.parl.gc.ca/
HouseBills/billsgovemment.aspx?Parl=37&ses=3&Language=E&Mode= I #C 12>.
14. Sharpe (B.CS.C 2002), supra note 12. See, e.g., Bill C-20, Legislative Summary C-20 LS-
444E; Bill C-12, Legislative Summary LS-467E.
15. Prime Minister Paul Martin, Speech from the Throne, 5 October 2004, online: <http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=sftdd+&Doc=sftddt2004_2_e.htm>.
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his minority government was Bill C-2, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code
(protection of children and other vulnerable persons) and the Canada
Evidence Act.16 The result was the successful amendment of s. 163.1(1993)
(see Appendix I). The Sharpe (B. C. S.C. 2002) case figured prominently
in comments in the House of Commons when Bill C-2 was introduced and
when it was considered by the Standing Committee on Justice, Human
Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness [Justice Committee].17
In his statement to the Justice Committee at their first meeting on the issue,
Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler indicated explicitly that the purpose of
the amendments to the child pornography provisions was to address the
negative outcome of the trial decision in Sharpe (B.C. S. C. 2002): "the idea
here [with Bill C-2] was to expand the definition of pornography, [to]...
facilitate the work of the prosecutors, and at the same time to address-
or redress, if you will-the lacunae that had developed as a result of the
Sharpe case.""
a. "Advocates or counsels" and the Sharpe case
Mr. Sharpe faced several possession charges, including possession for the
purpose of distribution or sale (s.163.1(3)(1993)) and simple possession
(s.163.1(4)(1993)), with elements of the simple possession charges
relating to both written materials (stories) and photographs. 19 Although he
was convicted on the charges relating to the photographs, Mr. Sharpe was
acquitted on those relating to the written materials. 0
There were two written works at issue in the decision. The first was
Sam Paloc ' Boyabuse: Flogging, Fun and Fortitude - A Collection of
Kiddiekink Classics (Sam Paloc was Mr. Sharpe's pen name).2' This
collection of short stories included, for example, "Timothy and the
Terrorist." Shaw J. quotes Mr. Sharpe's description of that story: "Young,
16. See Bill C-2, 3 81 Parliament, 1" Session, online: <http://www.2.parl.gc.ca/HouseBills/
BillsGovemment.aspx?Language=E&Mode= 1&Parl=38&ses=I 1#C2>.
17. Bill C-2 was considered in eleven meetings of the Justice Committee, one of which was
conducted in camera and for which evidence is not available. The Bill was amended with regards to
child pornography only by adding mandatory minimum sentences (voted on in Meeting 42), although
many other changes were suggested and discussed. See list of meetings of Standing Committee on
Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (JUST) for 38th Parliament, 1st
Session, online: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/committeelist.aspx?lang= 1&parlses=381&jnt=0&se
lid=e2l&com=8984>: Meeting 22, February 22, 2005; Meeting 24, March 8, 2005 [in camera];
Meeting 26, March 24, 2005; Meeting 27, April 5, 2005; Meeting 29, April 7, 2005; Meeting 31,
April 12, 2005; Meeting 32, April 14, 2005; Meeting 33, April 19, 2005; Meeting 34, April 21, 2005;
Meeting 35, May 3, 2005; Meeting 42, June 2, 2005.
18. Ibid. Meeting 22 at 10:05. This is also made clear in Bill C-2, Legislative Summary LS-480E,
Revised 16 June 2005.
19. Sharpe (B. C. S.C. 2002), supra note 12 at paras. 1-2.
20. Ibid. at paras. 122-129.
21. Ibid. at para. 4.
Child Pornography in Canada and the United States
Innocent White Boys Sold as Sex Slaves to a Sadistic and Murderous Sultan
Plot their own Freedom and Overthrow a Corrupt and Hated Regime in the
Process." Shaw J. notes that "the story contains beatings, man-boy and
boy-boy sexual acts and a circumcision. 2 2 The other written work at issue
was a book, written by Mr. Sharpe, and found in his apartment.
Shaw J. found that Mr. Sharpe's stories did not represent, pursuant
to the definition in s. 163.1(b) (1993), "written material...that advocates
or counsels sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years
that would be an offence under [the Criminal Code]. '23 He indicated that
although the works "arguably glorify the acts described therein" and that
"the descriptions may well be designed to titillate or excite the reader (if
the reader is so inclined)," the stories do not meet the definition because
they do not "actively advocate or counsel the reader to engage in the acts
described. 24
b. The responsive amendments
The simple conclusion reached by Parliament was that the "advocates or
counsels" test was far too generous to accused. Bill C-2 has therefore added to
the definition of child pornography s. 163. 1 (c)(2005) and s. 163. 1 (d)(2005).
The new s. 163.1 (c)(2005) defines as child pornography written material of
which the "dominant characteristic is the description, for a sexual purpose,
of sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would
be an offence under [the Criminal Code]. ' 25 The three key elements of
the new s.163.1(1)(c) are the "dominant characteristic" requirement, the
"sexual purpose" requirement, and the "activity that would be an offence"
requirement; s.163.1(d)(2005), using the same language, includes audio
recordings. This provision theoretically raises the same concerns, but the
present discussion will focus on s. 163.1(c)(2005).
The new s.163.1(c)(2005) requires material to describe "sexual
activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an
offence under this Act" (see Appendix I). This is the same limitation
that previously applied only to the "advocates or counsels" provision,
s.163.1(b)(1993/2005), and it represents a significant restriction. With
reference to the "advocates or counsels" section, McLachlin C.J. in Sharpe
(S.C.C.) cites this limit as one reason that the provision "is more limited
than the definition of visual pornography in s. 163.1(l)(a)(1993)."26
22. Ibid. at para. 9.
23. Ibid. at para. 36.
24. Ibid. at para. 33.
25. See Appendix I. The same amendment was forwarded in Bill C-20 and Bill C-12.
26. Sharpe (S.CC.), supra note 2 at para. 55. At para. 57 McLachlin C.J. provides a useful list of
examples.
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"Dominant characteristic" also appears elsewhere. The language is
used in s. 163(8) of the Criminal Code, which deals with adult obscenity
and was interpreted in R. v. Butler [Butler].27 However, the Court in
Sharpe (S.C.C.) rejects the "community standards" approach for child
pornography, and this is a central element of the interpretation of "dominant
characteristic" in Butler Further, the Supreme Court in R. v. Labaye
[Labaye] has moved away from the "community standards" approach for
adult indecency, and towards a more objective, harm-based test.2" More
relevant is McLachlin C.J.'s interpretation of "dominant characteristic"
and "sexual purpose" from Sharpe (S.C.C.), which is premised on its
application only to visual material. The visual provisions are limited by
anatomically specific language, but the objective test for the determination
of "dominant characteristic" and "sexual purpose" could easily be applied
to the new provisions. 9
"Sexual purpose" was also interpreted in Sharpe (S. C. C.) with regard to
the visual child pornography provisions. "Sexual purpose" was determined
to be context based, so that what might not be pornography in one context,
such as in a family album, might be in another, such as an album with
photographs of many children, or photographs with a sexual caption.30 The
"sexual purpose" test is arguably directed at the submissions made by the
Crown at Mr. Sharpe's trial, Sharpe (B. C. S. C. 2002). There, the prosecution
advanced the theory that Mr. Sharpe's writings were pornography because
they were intended to be. 3 To support this theory, the Crown entered into
evidence letters from Mr. Sharpe's computer, arguing they clearly indicate
that Mr. Sharpe meant the stories to be stimulating, for himself and others.32
Shaw J. agreed with this analysis, but rejected this Crown theory, because
"it attempts to draw a distinction between pornography, on the one hand,
and artistic merit, on the other."33 The "sexual purpose" requirement of the
new "dominant characteristic" branch of the child pornography definition
directly addresses the Crown argument, and seems positioned to make
it successful in the future. As indicated by the comments of Minister of
Justice Cotler before the Justice Committee, Mr. Sharpe's works would
have met the "dominant characteristic" and "sexual purpose" test.
Although arguably still restrictive given the legislative intent and the
reasoning from Sharpe (S.C.C.), particularly the limitations of requiring
27. R v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, (1992) 89 D.L.R. (4th) 449 [Butler].
28. R. v. Labaye, 2005 SCC 80, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728 [Labaye].
29. Sharpe (S. C. C.), supra note 2 at paras. 50-51.
30. Ibid. at para. 5 I.
31. Sharpe (B.C.S.C. 2002), supra note 12 at paras. 101-104.
32. Ibid. at para 102.
33. Ibid. at para. 104.
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a "sexual purpose" and that the writing describe an actual offence, the
new s.163.1(c)(2005) deliberately seeks to broaden the definition of child
pornography using the "dominant characteristic" language. The definition
of child pornography, which dictates the scope of material that is made
illegal, is central to liberty concerns. The "advocates and counsels"
provision (163.1 (b)(1993)) has not been significantly altered or removed. 34
However, the addition of the "dominant characteristic" provisions
significantly changes the balance that was laid out by the Supreme Court
in Sharpe (S.C.C.). The effect of this change is critical to the judicial
reception of the new provision, because the inclusion of written works
and drawings was central to the concerns in Sharpe (S. C.C.). Further,
the particular manner of this inclusion was a critical consideration in the
Supreme Court preserving the previous legislation. 35
However, it is important to stress that even the new broadened
definition, read in context with the rest of s. 163. 1, as "the advocates and
counsels" section was in Sharpe (S.C.C.), would still likely exclude most
literary and artistic material that is often raised as a concern. The amended
definition would not, for example, put Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet36
at risk-an important point that is often missed. 37 McLachlin C.J., in
the context of the "advocates and counsels" provision, notes that given
a "purposive approach.. .works aimed at description and exploration of
various aspects of life that incidentally touch on illegal acts with children
are unlikely to be caught. '38 The input of the witnesses before the Justice
Committee indicates that the "dominant characteristic" provision is
intended to operate in a similar manner.39
c. "Artistic merit" and the Sharpe case
Section 163.1(6) & (7)(1993) previously provided that a "court shall
find the accused not guilty if the representation or written material that is
alleged to constitute child pornography has artistic merit or an educational,
scientific, or medical purpose" (see Appendix I). Despite Bill C-2 being
34. The only difference is the addition of audio recordings: see Appendix 1. Note also that the
"advocates and counsels" provision was considered by the Ontario Court of Appeal: R. v. Beattie,
75 O.R. (3d) 117, (2005) 196 O.A.C. 95 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused without reasons [2005]
S.C.C.A. No. 319.
35. Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at para. 35.
36. Kennedy J. in Ashcroft, supra note 3, helpfully cites Romeo and Juliet, act 1, sc. 2, 1. 9, where
Capulet remarks, "She hath not seen the change of fourteen years."
37. See, e.g., the statements to the Justice Committee of Bill Freeman, Writers' Union of Canada
(Meeting 27 at 9:35) and John Greyson, Artist Member, Canadian Artists' Representation (Meeting 3 I
at 9:15), supra note 17. However, this by no means invalidates the concerns of artists over the "chilling
effect" the legislation could have on expression. See also note 120.
38. Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at para. 57.
39. See Minister of Justice Cotler, Meeting 22, supra note 17.
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an omnibus bill which involved several other significant amendments
to the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act (including adding
the offence of "voyeurism" and significantly altering the law on child
testimony) the child pornography amendments, especially regarding
"artistic merit," occupied the majority of the debate in the House of
Commons and discussion in the Justice Committee.4" Mr. Sharpe raised
the "artistic merit" defence at his trial, and Shaw J. heard from four experts
on the issue-three English professors and one psychiatrist. A useful
example, since Shaw J. indicates that he placed "substantial weight" on
his testimony, is Professor James Miller, from the University of Western
Ontario, who testified for the defence.4' He broke down Mr. Sharpe's
stories based on a variety of literary elements, finding examples of
allegory, characterization, plot, parody, setting, and other literary devices.
Two of the central elements of the analysis were theme and the literary
tradition Mr. Sharpe's works represent. Miller found the "ethical theme
of fortitude" throughout Mr. Sharpe's work and classified it under "the
Sadean tradition of transgressive literature," which refers to the writings
of Marquis de Sade; "focusing attention on transgressive sexuality... [i]t
represents the defiant breaking of taboos controlling sexual relations and
practices."42 Shaw J. placed less emphasis on the testimony of the other
defence witness. He also largely rejected the evidence of the Crown expert
because his view of morality played a "significant role" in his analysis and
he implicitly applied a "community standards of tolerance" test, which,
as has been discussed, the Supreme Court rejected in Sharpe (S.C.C.).43
Shaw J.'s decision carefully considers the law from Sharpe (S.C.C.), and
in concluding that Mr. Sharpe's work has artistic merit, he takes note of
McLachlin C.J.'s indication that "any objectively established artistic value,
however small, suffices to support the defence."" On the strength of the
expert testimony, and given this low bar, Shaw J. found that Mr. Sharpe
succeeded on the "artistic merit" defence.45
d. The responsive amendments
In response, the new Criminal Code provisions remove the defence of
"artistic merit" (see Appendix I). The amended provisions require the
accused to prove materials have a "legitimate purpose related to the
40. House of Commons Debates, No. 007 (13 October 2004); No. 010 (18 October 2004); No. 112
(9 June 2005).
41. Sharpe (B.C. S.C. 2002), supra note 12 at para. 68.
42. Ibid. at paras. 61, 64.
43. Ibid. at para. 96.
44. Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at para. 63, quoted in Sharpe (B.C. S.C. 2002), supra note 12 at
para. 113.
45. Sharpe (B.C. S.C. 2002), supra note 12 at para. 121.
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administration of justice, or to science, medicine, education or art,"
(s. 163.1 (6)(a)(2005)) and to further establish that the work "does not pose
an undue risk of harm to minors" (s.163.1(6)(b)(2005)) (see Appendix
I). Minister of Justice Cotler refers to this as the "two-pronged, harm-
based, legitimate-purpose defence. 4 6 It is intended to place a much higher
burden on the accused and attempts to allow much less material to be
saved. Justice Minister Cotler indicated that "[u]nder this test it will not
be enough to show some artistic value, as was the situation in the Sharpe
case."
47
The Minister also indicated that Bill C-2 creates a "harms-based" test,
which was the focus of the Supreme Court in Sharpe (S.C.C.).48 However,
this somewhat misrepresents the majority decision in Sharpe (S.C.C.).
Although McLachlin C.J. for the majority considered the impact of harm
on children, her analysis focused mostly on the definition section and the
overall balancing of freedom of expression with protecting children.4 9
Sharpe (S. C. C.) requires that some harmful material will be saved by the
defence, as this is its purpose: "Parliament clearly intended that some
pornographic and possibly harmful works would escape prosecution on
the basis of this defence; otherwise there is no need for it."50 The Bill C-2
amendments seem more influenced by the minority decision in Sharpe
(S. C. C.), which found s. 163.1(1993) entirely constitutional." L'Heureux-
Dub6 J. emphasizes that the materials caught by the 1993 definition of child
pornography are legitimately restricted, because the message conveyed by
such material is inherently harmful, regardless of its source or the nature
of its production or possession. This justification naturally and logically
includes works of the imagination. 2 The view that the material caught by
the definition of child pornography is inherently harmful speaks directly
to the new defence in s. 163(1)(b)(2005), which requires that material
46. Meeting 22, supra note 17 at 10:20.
47. Ibid. at 9:25.
48. Meeting 27, supra note 17 at 9:25. Mr. Marc David (Chair of the National Criminal Justice
Section, Canadian Bar Association) suggests this in his statement to the Justice Committee.
49. Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at paras. 18-110.
50. Ibid. at para. 65.
51. Ibid. at para. 242.
52. Ibid. at paras 217, 220. Justices Bastarache and LeBel, dissenting, make a similar claim in
Labaye, supra note 28 at para. 109: "According to contemporary Canadian social morality, acts such
as child pornography, incest, polygamy and bestiality are unacceptable regardless of whether or not
they cause social harm. The community considers these acts to be harmful in themselves."
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not pose an undue risk of harm.53 The addition of "undue" softens the
language, making it is less extreme than the standard the dissent in Sharpe
(S. C. C.) advocates. However, it is clear that the amendments enacted by
Bill C-2 attempt to shift the balance in the direction of preventing harm
to children, and thus away from the majority decision which emphasizes
that "artistic expression rests at the heart of freedom of expression values
and any doubt in this regard must be resolved in favour of freedom of
expression."54
II. United States
1. Caution regarding the United States law
Beyond the cases noted below, this discussion examines only federal law
in the United States dealing with the possession of child pornography.
It is pedantic to note that the states have criminal law jurisdiction in the
United States, but it is relevant to the current discussion that in U.S. v.
Maxwell the 11ht Circuit Court (Alabama, Florida, and Georgia) found
the simple possession offence in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A outside federal
jurisdiction under the trade and commerce power.5 Fortunately, the value
of the comparison in the current discussion is not tied to the validity of
the American law.
2. History of child pornography in the United States56
"The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
'Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press."' 57 The protection of freedom of speech has been read very broadly
in the United States, and as in Canada, freedom of speech is a source
of much constitutional litigation in the area of obscenity. The American
53. The harm-based test for adult indecency outlined by the Supreme Court in Labaye, supra note
28, has relevant parallels to the legislated harm-based defence in s.163(l)(b)(2005). The first part
of the Labaye test requires conduct which by its nature represents a "significant risk of harm" to an
individual or society, and references three examples of types of harm that can arise from indecency,
of which the second, discussed in detail at paragraph 36, is "harm to society by predisposing others
to anti-social conduct". This type of harm is one of the principal justifications for child pornography
possession laws (as is discussed below).
54. Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at 61.
55. U.S. v. Maxwell, 386 F.3D 1042 (111 Cir. 2004). For a discussin of this case, see "Recent Cases:
US. v. Maxwell" (2005) 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2477. In U.S. v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286 (111 Cir. 2006)
[Williams], the same Court more recently found the "pandering" provision, which was added by the
PROTECT Act, unconstitutionally vague. Among other things, this section prohibited advertising or
promotion, which is notably similar to the addition of "advertising" to the offence in 161.1(3)(2005)
(Appendix I).
56. See also Williams, supra note 55 at 1289-1296. Circuit Judge Reavley (from the 5' Circuit,
sitting by designation for the 11' Circuit) provides a detailed overview of the legislative progression
and judicial consideration of child pornography law in the United States.
57. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law, 15th ed. (New York: Foundation
Press, 2004) at 984. See also <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/html/amdt .html>.
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Bill of Rights, like almost all constitutional documents, does not contain
an explicit limiting provision equivalent to s. I of the Canadian Charter.
However, this does not mean that freedom of speech is not limited. The
United States Supreme Court has found "obscenity" to be outside the
protection of the First Amendment because it is "of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."58 The limiting of
obscene speech in the United States has thus been accomplished through
various controversial definitions of obscenity. The original landmark case
in this regard is Roth v. U.S. (1957) and subsequent significant reevaluations
of the law have occurred in the complementary 1973 decisions Miller v.
California [Miller] and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.5 9
The issue of child pornography did not come before the U.S. Court
until 1982. In the foundational case of New York v. Ferber [Ferber] the
U.S. Court decided that Miller should not apply to child pornography, and
separately excluded child pornography from First Amendment protection .60
White J. for a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court indicated that the State
should have more freedom in restricting this form of speech than regular
obscenity.6' In Ferber the U.S. Court identified a compelling State interest,
beyond that with regards to adult obscenity, in protecting the psychological
well-being of children.62 The U.S. Court rejects a "community standards"
type test-such as was used in Miller-because, as White J. indicates, "it
is irrelevant to the child [who has been abused ] whether or not the material
... has a literary, artistic, political or social value" (Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissented on this point).63
However, the law at issue in Ferber dealt with the distribution of child
pornography, not possession. In regard to adult obscenity, the U.S. Court
found in Stanley v. Georgia (1969) [Stanley] that the First Amendment
prohibits private possession offences.' It was not until Osborne v. Ohio
(1990) [Osborne] that child pornography possession offences were
considered. In Osborne, the Majority found that Stanley does not apply to
58. Ibid. at 1094.
59. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957 [Roth]); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) [Miller]; Paris
Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
60. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) [Ferber].
61. Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 57 at 1115.
62. Ferber, supra note 60.
63. Ibid. at 761.
64. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) [Stanley].
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child pornography because, consistent with the Ferber decision, there is a
greater State interest in protecting children from harm.65
a. Current judicial consideration
Child pornography was most recently considered by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Ashcroft.66 At issue was the definition of child pornography from
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), particularly 18
U.S.C.A. § 2256 (8)(B) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256 (8)(D). (B) includes visual
material where "such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct [emphasis added]" and (D) deals
with the advertising of images described in the section. 67 At issue with
regards to possession is (B), which includes "virtual" child pornography
in the definition.
The legislation does not attempt to exclude virtual child pornography
from the FirstAmendment with an obscenity test, as provided for in Miller.6"
Further, Kennedy J., writing for the majority of the U.S. Court, concludes
quickly and succinctly that virtual child pornography extends beyond the
special category of speech removed from First Amendment in Ferber.
Virtual child pornography, by not meeting either of these requirements,
is thus protected speech, and Kennedy J. indicates that the provision
"prohibits speech despite its serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."69 The U.S. Court surveys the various arguments regarding child
pornography (as will be discussed below), but ultimately strikes down the
legislation as overbroad.
O'Connor J., dissenting in part, agrees that the inclusion of"youthful-
adult" pornography (young-looking minors) is overbroad, but suggests that
the prohibition on "virtual-child" pornography (wholly computer-created
images) is not.7° Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Scalia J. in part in
65. Osborne . Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) [Osborne]. In this case, as in Sharpe (S.C.C.), there
was significant consideration given to the sufficiency of the limitation provided by the definition of
obscenity. The majority found that the Ohio law, as it had been re-interpreted by the Ohio Supreme
Court, provided a sufficiently narrow definition. Brennan J., who concurred in the 1969 decision in
Stanley, along with Marshall and Stevens JJ., dissented, finding the pornography definition overbroad
and extending the constitutional prohibition of possession offences from Stanley to the child
pornography context.
66. Ashcroft, supra note 3.
67. Subsection (C) was not before the Court, but deals with innocent images of actual children
modified so that they appear to be engaged in "sexually explicit conduct." Kennedy J. at 242 indicates
that "[a]lthough morphed images may fall within the definition of virtual child pornography, they
implicate the interests of real children and are in that sense closer to the images in Ferber." Note also
that "sexually explicit conduct" is separately defined in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(2) and there is a separate
definition for (B). See note 74.
68. Ashcroft, supra note 3.
69. Ibid. at 246.
70. Ibid.at 261.
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his dissent, disagrees that the definition in the CPPA extends beyond the
most "hardcore" materials, which would come within the protection of
Ferber. He also justifies the provisions by noting that if it has not already,
technology is soon likely to make distinguishing actual records of abuse
from virtual images impractical.71 Thomas J., concurring along these lines
but deferring the legal conclusion, suggests that if technology does evolve
in this way, then a narrow definition, with a sufficient defence, may be
constitutionally sound at that time.72
b. Legislative response
Not surprisingly, the dissent of Rehnquist C.J. and concurring judgment of
Thomas J. have been fertile ground for Congress's response to the Ashcroft
decision. In 2003 Congress passed the PROTECT Act, the preamble of
which directly addresses the issue of technology. It asserts that technology
has changed, that distinguishing real and virtual child pornography is and
will continue to be "prohibitively expensive," and goes on to state that the
decision in Ashcrofi has caused a dramatic rise in defendants arguing the
images they possessed are virtual and not real pornography, making the
law difficult to prosecute. 73 The PROTECTAct thus amends 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2256 (8)(B) to read, "such visual depiction is a digital image, computer
image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from,
that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct"74 [emphasis added].
Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256 (11) "indistinguishable" is determined on an
ordinary person test, and excludes "depictions that are drawings, cartoons,
sculptures, or paintings depicting minors or adults." The PROTECT Act
also includes 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(c)(2), providing a positive defence
that the production did not involve actual minors.
Congress has thus responded to Ashcroft by attempting, using different
language, to include virtual child pornography under the exception created
in Ferber. The legislation is tailored to the U.S. Supreme Court's concerns
71. Ibid. at 267.
72. Ibid. at 259.
73. PROTECTAct, supra note 4.
74. Importantly, a more specific definition was added by the PROTECTAct. For the purposes of the
virtual child pornography provision, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(2)(B) defines "sexually explicit conduct"
as:
(i) graphic sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal,
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or lascivious simulated sexual intercourse
where the genitals, breast, or pubic area of any person is exhibited;
(ii) graphic or lascivious simulated;
(1) bestiality;
(11) masturbation; or
(IllI) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
(iii) graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.
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with regard to technology, the potential artistic value of the material
captured, and the availability of a defence. The issue is, of course, much
more complex. However, it is sufficient to indicate for the purposes of the
current discussion that Congress is attempting to shift the balance in favour
of protecting children over freedom of expression, although the possible
scope of the shift, because of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, is
much more narrow than what the Canadian Parliament has attempted.
However, Congress additionally enacted a separate, parallel child
pornography provision, 18 U.S.C.A. §1466A. This provision is similar
to the Canadian law, as it includes the offence of possessing "a visual
depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture or
painting" that: depicts a minor engaging in "sexually explicit conduct"
and "is obscene;" or that depicts certain specific types of activity and
lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."75 Although
the legislation is constitutionally suspect, it demonstrates the extent to
which American legislators would like to push for inclusion in defining
child pornography.
III. Comparison and analysis
The usual justifications for freedom of speech are familiar, and McLachlin
C.J. summarizes some of the major ideas succinctly: "individual self-
fulfilment, finding the truth through the open exchange of ideas, and the
political discourse fundamental to democracy."76 Both Canada and the
United States have rigorous and principled protection of free speech, but
in both nations it has been accepted that there are limits with regard to free
expression in the context of obscenity.77 Similarly, in both countries there
is a tradition of hesitancy, or of particular scrutiny, where a law targets the
content and not simply the form of expression.78 However, both recognize
that content regulation is not entirely barred. White J. for a unanimous
U.S. Court summarizes this justification regarding child pornography
in Ferber: "a content-based classification of speech has been accepted
because it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of the
given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs
75. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1466A(b). The item in question must "depict an image that is, or appears to be, of
a minor engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse, including
genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite
sex." This specificity is more restrictive than the Canadian definition.
76. Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at para 23.
77. Butler, supra note 27; Roth and Miller, supra note 59.
78. In Canada, this was a central consideration in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Irwin Toy]. In the U.S., this issue is considered in the child
pornography context in Ferber, supra note 60.
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the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case
adjudication is required."79
The balancing in Canada under s. I of the Charter is similar. Applying
this form of reasoning, courts in both nations have rejected a "community
standards" test for child pornography.8° In Ashcroft, the U.S. Court is
clear that a "community standards" test is only valuable where there is
some conceivable value to society that needs to be weighed against the
tolerance of the community." In the U.S., as in Canada, child pornography
is rejected as a class, so that case-by case weighing of "value" is not
necessary. This all-or-nothing approach makes the definitional limitations
for child pornography key concerns in Sharpe (S.C.C.), Osborne, and
Ashcroft, and is the core of the significant judicial disagreement seen
on both Courts. This disagreement is indicative, in both jurisdictions,
of a residual concern that speech should never be easily rejected and
restricted. As Brennan J. (dissenting) notes in Osborne, "[w]hen speech
is eloquent and the ideas expressed lofty, it is easy to find restrictions on
them invalid. But were the First Amendment limited to such discourse,
our freedom would be sterile indeed.
' 82
The principal concern underlying consideration of the issue in both
jurisdictions is the extent to which extraneous or potentially valuable
expression might be caught by a definition of child pornography, and
thus be included in the unprotected class. Thus the Canadian Court in
Sharpe (S.C.C.) created exceptions to the definition and the majority in
Ashcroft rejected expanding the class of material excluded from the First
Amendment in Ferber.83 The dissenting judges in Sharpe (S.C.C.) and
Ashcroft argue that the definition is restricted to sufficiently "hardcore"
materials that it is protection enough.84 A similar concern, which stems
from the same source, is whether material that is unjustly captured can be
saved by a defence. The defences suggested by the U.S. Court in Ashcroft
and provided by the PROTECTAct, and the "artistic merit" and "legitimate
purpose" defences in Canada, reflect this fear of class, content-based
79. Ferber, supra note 60 at 763-64. See also Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at para. 24.
80. Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2; Butler, supra note 27; Ferber supra note 60; Miller supra note
59.
81. Ashcroft, supra note 3, which determines that "virtual" child pornography might have some
value, and thus cannot be excluded from the First Amendment, as child pornography showing actual
abuse had been in Ferber.
82. Osborne, supra note 65 at 148; see also Sharpe (S. C. C.), supra note 2 at para. 21.
83. The division of child pornography in this way, requiring different levels of justification for
restrictions on records of actual abuse and other 'child pornography,' has also been suggested in
Canada: see Bruce Ryder, "The Harms of Child Pornography Law" (2003) 36 U.B.C. L.Rev. 101.
84. Unlike the U.S. Court, L'Heureux-Dubd J. additionally conceded that speech of some value may
be caught, but emphasized that this would be rare and that the goal of protecting children is sufficient
to outweigh the concern. See Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2.
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restrictions. Such defences operate in the manner of a tail-end "community
standards" test. Definitional concerns reflect underlying judgments about
what particular content is likely or unlikely to have enough "value" to be
worth protecting. Although the amended legislation in both jurisdictions
aims for a "right" balance in the context of what the Court is willing to
accept, there is no objectively correct interpretation of what is and is not
"child pornography."
1. The value of sexual speech
The justification for allowing bans on child pornography is largely based on
its negligible value as expression, and the assumption that such expression
has such a total lack of value should be briefly addressed." Engaging in a
debate on the fundamental justifications for free speech is well beyond the
scope of this paper. However, in proceeding, it is important to note-and
oversimplify-the argument that subversive speech, regardless of content,
should be protected in a free and democratic society, and that sexual speech,
because it is subversive, should not be suppressed.8 6 The classification of
Mr. Sharpe's writings as "transgressive" literature in Sharpe (B.C. S.C.
2002) should not be quickly ignored. Before proceeding to other factors
considered by the Canadian and U.S. Court, it is useful to note that the
general treatment of sexual expression is itself a contentious issue, and the
easy dismissal of child pornography as beyond the pale in a society that
values and protects free speech should not pass unquestioned. On this, as
on the other points to be discussed, there is no "right" answer; there is,
however, a lack of debate.
2. Possession with the intent to distribute
The link between child pornography and child abuse is central to the
restriction of such material. The production of child pornography is argued
by almost no one to be tolerable in any society, with the glaring exception
of groups such as NAMBLA, who question the underlying justification
that children cannot consent to, and should not be involved in, sexual
relations with adults. 87 Distribution and possession offences are justified
by tying these activities to actual child abuse. With regard to distribution
offences it is generally accepted, as the U.S. Court accepted in Ferber, that
distribution is inherently linked to production: "the distribution network
85. Irwin Toy, supra note 78; see also Sharpe (S. C. C.), supra note 2 at 23. Regarding adult obscenity,
the majority in Labaye, supra note 28, seems to move away from judging the value of expression by
favouring a harm-based, objective test.
86. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman, "Disciplining the Unruly: Sexual Outlaws, Little Sisters and the
Legacy of Butler" (2003) 36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 77.
87. NAMBLA, the North American Man-Boy Love Association, argues for the rights of young
people to consent to sex.
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for child pornography must be closed if the production of material which
requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled."88
Possession for the purposes of distribution is an offence in Canada,
163.1(3)(1993/2005), but this and similar child pornography offences
have not been a focus of legislative or judicial attention in Canada or the
United States. Debate does not begin to emerge until offences of simple
possession are considered, and it is indicative of the debate regarding
these offences that the minimum restriction required by the UN optional
protocol relating to child pornography is possession for the purpose of
distribution.89
3. Arguments regarding child pornography possession offences
a. The link between child pornography and child abuse
Although distribution arguments are to some extent applicable to
possession, the context of the possession argument is more complex.
Broadly construed, there are two arguments which justify possession by
drawing a link to child abuse: the theoretical causal argument, and the
practical enforcement argument. The theoretical causal argument suggests
child pornography fuels the cognitive distortions of pedophiles, and that
in doing so it potentially incites child abuse. Possession of it should thus
be illegal. 90 The practical enforcement argument rests on two claims. First,
possession offences aid in the enforcement of bans on distribution and
production, which are more difficult to prosecute; second, they reduce the
market for child pornography, thus removing support for production and
reducing incidence of child abuse. 91
The theoretical link: cognitive distortions and inciting child abuse
Because the cognitive link is the most potentially powerful justification
for restricting child pornography, it is also one of the most contested. The
general issue is further complicated because few commentators on the
issue of child pornography feel the need to rationalize their contentions or
justify their arguments. Although McLachlin C.J., as an example, separates
the argument regarding "cognitive distortions" from the argument that
child pornography incites abuse, the sole underlying concern is whether
viewing child pornography increases the risk of child abuse.
88. Ferber, supra note 60 at 759.
89. Supra note 1. Article 3(l)(c) requires state parties, at a minimum, to prohibit: "producing,
distributing, disseminating, importing, exporting, offering, selling or possessing for the above purposes
child pornography as defined in article 2."
90. Ashcroft, supra note 3 at 253-54; Sharpe (S.CC.), supra note 2 at 88-89.
91. The arguments are mentioned, for example, in Ferber, supra note 60 at 758-60 (which extends
the argument only as far as distribution and promotion); in Osborne, supra note 65 at 108-10; in
Ashcroft, supra note 3 at 249-51; and in Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at paras. 90, 93.
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That child pornography reinforces fantasies seems instinctively
obvious, and the experts who testified before the Justice Committee
and work with pedophiles indicated that their experience supports this
connection. 92 Nevertheless, on the isolated issue of the influence of child
pornography on those who view it, Canada and the United States have
maintained the libertarian view espoused in Stanley, which Kennedy J.
refers to when he states that "the right to think is the beginning of freedom,
and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the
beginning of thought."93 McLachlin C.J. echoes this in Sharpe (S.C.C.):
"the restriction imposed by s. 163.1(4)(1993) regulates expression where
it borders on thought. Indeed, it is a fine line that separates a state attempt
to control the private possession of self-created expressive materials from
a state attempt to control thought or opinion.
94
However, considering the further argument that child pornography
"fuels fantasies that incite offenders" one begins to encounter debate
involving scientific studies of pedophilia. 95 In Sharpe (S. C.C.) McLachlin
C.J. indicated that the scientific evidence of a connection at the time was
weak. Unfortunately, at the time of the drafting of Bill C-2, no more
conclusive evidence was available. 96 The principal expert witnesses heard
by the Justice Committee on Bill C-2 were Mr. Karl Hanson (Senior
Research Officer, Corrections Research Division, Department of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness) and Dr. Peter Collins (Manager,
Forensic Psychiatry Unit, Behavioural Sciences Section, Ontario Provincial
Police and Associate Professor, University of Toronto).97
Even these two experts disagreed. The issue is difficult to study,
and a scientific confirmation or rejection of the common sense link does
not seem forthcoming. An interesting complication noted by Dr. Collins
confirms this sentiment:
[B]efore the Internet it was exceedingly hard to get child pornography. It
was expensive. It took some effort. The Internet has allowed affordability,
accessibility, and anonymity, when it comes to child pornography. We
are now perhaps seeing a group of offenders who would not have come
to light before. 98
92. See, e.g., Det Insp Angie Howe, Meeting 35, supra note 17, at 10:10.
93. Ashcroft, supra note 3 at 253.
94. Sharpe (S. C.C.), supra note 2 at para. 108.
95. Ibid. at para. 86.
96. Ibid. at para. 88. Dr. Peter Collins was a witness both in Sharpe (B.C. S.C. 1999), supra note 7,
and before the Justice Committee concerning Bill C-2 at Meeting 35, supra note 17.
97. Meeting 35, supra note 17.
98. Ibid at 11:25.
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Thus, to the extent that previous studies are informative, they are likely
measuring very different offenders from those child pornography seeks
to target in the technology age. There is simply no conclusive answer
available from science.
The reasonable connection can thus be accepted or rejected as sufficient
depending on the factors it is being balanced against. In Sharpe (SC. C.),
McLachlin C.J. finds the evidence sufficient. Noting that "complex human
behaviour may not lend itself to precise scientific demonstration," she
indicates that there is nevertheless a "reasoned apprehension of harm,"
and that "the courts cannot hold Parliament to a higher standard of proof
than the subject matter admits of."99 However, even if the evidence of a
connection is accepted as sufficient, there is the counter-argument that the
law should not prohibit thoughts, but acts. Marshall J. colourfully notes
in Stanley that, "given the present state of knowledge, the State may no
more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may
lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry
books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade
spirits."' 0 In 1969, he was referring to adult pornography that would now
be far from the most extreme that is freely available, but the principle
behind the argument remains current and the science has advanced less
than would have been hoped.
Yet neither position is unreasonable, and this overview of the
status of the social science data and the various arguments seeks only
to demonstrate that the link between child abuse and child pornography
cannot be conclusively established, and that even if it could, the law could
reasonably choose to decline to prosecute individuals on the basis of such
a connection.
The practical link: prosecutorial efficiency and the market for child
pornography
The other argument linking child pornography to child abuse takes the law
enforcement perspective that possession offences assist in reducing the
production and distribution of the material and therefore aid in protecting
children. The counter-argument, from a libertarian perspective, is that
regardless of this assertion, the State should be required to endure the
99. Sharpe (S. CC.), supra note 2 at para 89. Notably, the standard applied to such evidence regarding
child pornography, as a class, in Sharpe (S.C.C.) seems less stringent than the standard for the Crown
to prove adult indecency on a case-by-case basis, which is set out by McLachlin C.J. in Labaye, supra
note 28 at paras. 58-61. The likely justification, as she notes in Labaye at para. 61, is that "risk is a
relative concept. The more extreme the nature of the harm, the lower the degree of risk that may be
required to permit use of the ultimate sanction of criminal law."
100. Stanley, supra note 64 at 567.
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headache of prosecuting only distribution, or possession for the purpose of
distribution, in order to preserve privacy and freedom of expression. 10 1
There have been strong dissenting voices on possession offences
generally in Canada and the United States. The dissentingjustices ofthe U.S.
Court in Osborne applied the rigorous protection of privacy from Stanley;
Brennan J. interestingly suggests that possessing child pornography is no
different from receiving a newspaper knowing it was produced using child
labour: sanctions against possession would help combat the child labour
problem, but could not override the right to receive the newspaper. 102
In her concurring opinion on the B.C. Court of Appeal in Sharpe (B.C.
C.A.), Southin J.A. notes that "...to the extent to which, if at all, American
authorities on their Constitution, are of value in Canada, I agree with the
animadversions of Brennan J. on making 'possession' a crime. ' 1°3
In Sharpe (S.C.C.) the Court declined to address whether the
prosecutorial efficiency argument could support possession offences, and
McLachlin C.J. was content to leave this as a "positive side-effect of the
law."'1 4 The connection of possession to the market for pornography is also
given short consideration, with the Court in Sharpe (S. C. C.) accepting that
production is fuelled by the market, and that possession offences reduce
the market.0 5 Reinforcing bans on production and distribution is thus seen
as a valid but not necessarily sufficient ground for supporting possession
bans. 10
6
In Osborne, which considered records of actual abuse, the U.S. Court
endorsed possession offences, approving of the State attempt "to stamp
out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain."' 17 In Ashcroft, which
considered "virtual" child pornography, the U.S. Court distinguishes virtual
pornography as not contributing to the "market," rather it is suggested
that if virtual child pornography were truly indistinguishable, it would
displace records of actual abuse as producers would be able to avoid the
risk of using real children. 08 Having already decided that virtual child
pornography is protected speech, the U.S. Court in that case indicates that
101. See Stanley, supra note 64, and the opinion of Southin J.A. in Sharpe (B. C. CA.), supra note 8.
102. Osborne, supra note 65 at 145, n. 19.
103. Sharpe (B.C C.A.), supra note 8 at para. 56. Given the context of her judgment, however, Southin
J.A. was likely referring only to self-created materials such as those at issue in Sharpe (B.C.C.A.) and
not agreeing with Brennan J. more generally that any possession offence violates the rights of privacy
and free expression.
104. Sharpe (S. CC.), supra note 2 at para. 90.
105. Ibid. at para. 92.
106. Ibid. at para. 93.
107. Osborne, supra note 65 at 110. The argument is also marshalled by Congress in its note from
recent amendments (18 U.S.C.A. § 2551) to bolster the trade and commerce power basis for the
federal child pornography provisions: Adam Walsh Child Protection Act, 2006, supra note 4 at § 501.
108. Ashcroft, supra note 3 at 254.
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the prosecutorial efficiency argument "in essence, is that protected speech
may be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech. This analysis turns
the First Amendment upside down."'10 9
Both the Canadian and U.S. Supreme Court deal with these arguments
very concisely, but with very different emphasis. The Canadian Court,
having largely accepted the arguments regarding grooming (as discussed
below), cognitive distortions, and incitement, was not particularly
concerned with this aspect. The U.S. Court in Ashcrofi had essentially
decided the issue in advance by including virtual child pornography under
the First Amendment protection, and distinguishing Osborne.
Just like the arguments with regards to cognitive distortion and
incitement, a connection is easy to identify, but it is the context of the
ultimate balancing, and not the strength of the connection, that determines
the outcome. It is the nature of the material considered that justified the
U.S. Court in endorsing this connection in Osborne but rejecting it in
Ashcroft, for example. The connection arguments are marshalled depending
on the underlying characterization of the content of the expression being
discussed. If the content is deemed worthless, the connections are sufficient
to outweigh the liberty concern, as in Canada and Osborne. If they are
considered to have some peripheral value, the connections are deemed
insufficient to balance the restriction, as in Asherofi. There is thus no
"right" answer to the question, except that dictated by the value assigned
to the expression before the strength of the connection is considered.
b. Grooming
Another argument that has been advanced is that possession of
pornography should be restricted because it is used in the "grooming" of
sexual abuse victims. As noted by Kennedy J., "a child who is reluctant
to engage in sexual activity with an adult, or to pose for sexually explicit
photographs, can sometimes be convinced by viewing depictions of other
children 'having fun' participating in such activity."" 0 The argument that
possession should be restricted because it makes pornography available
for this purpose was accepted by the Canadian Court in Sharpe (S. C. C.),
where it was concluded that possession offences are likely to prevent the
seduction of children."' In testimony before the Justice Committee on
Bill C-2, none of the expert witnesses placed any weight on the grooming
argument, noting that pedophiles were much more likely to use adult
pornography for this purpose."2 Perhaps the most trenchant argument in
109. Ibid. at 255.
110. Ashcroft, supra note 3 at 241, quoting from the congressional findings of the CPPA 1996.
111. Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at para. 91.
112. See, e.g., Dr. Collins, Meeting 35, supra note 17 at 10:35.
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this respect is advanced by Kennedy J. in Ashcroft: "there are many things
innocent in themselves... such as cartoons, video games, and candy, that
might be used for immoral purposes, yet we would not expect those to be
prohibited because they can be misused."'1 13
Again, the context of analysis determines the weight to be given to
the argument. Where the speech being restricted is marginalized and the
potential harm to children is emphasized, the argument that it may be used
for grooming is found instructive. Where the right to freely possess the
material underlies the analysis, the argument is rejected.
4. Divergent theories of harm
For each of the major arguments generally considered with regard to
child pornography, it has been suggested that multiple positions can
be reasonably supported in a free and democratic society."4 Although
adherents of different interpretations hold their opinions very strongly, and
validly, none of the practical or behavioural justifications for possession
offences is conclusive if freedom of expression concerns are enforced with
sufficient strictness. Underlying the differences on each of these arguments
is a simple difference in the characterization of child pornography. The
U.S. Court in Asheroft maintains the line suggested by Ferber, which
posits that a class restriction of child pornography must be defined based
on how it is made, not on the content it communicates: "where the speech is
neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the
protection of the First Amendment." " 5 This more or less dictates a position
on each of the arguments canvassed. This position can be summarized as
a slippery-slope argument that protects all but the most directly harmful
material from suppression. The basis for this position is that prohibiting
more material risks that speech not deserving of the morally loaded brand
"child pornography" will be caught. It is a logical and defensible position
from a liberty standpoint, and is the position that Alan Borovoy, for the
Canadian Civil Liberties Association, argued before the Justice Committee
should be adopted in Canada." 6
In complete contrast, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 in her dissent in Sharpe
(S. C.C.) strongly characterizes child pornography as inherently harmful.
113. Ashcroft, supra note 3 at 251. The same argument was advanced to the Justice Committee by
Alan Borovoy, Meeting 26, supra note 17 at 9:30.
114. This is true even of the courts. As noted, there were dissents in Sharpe (B.C. CA.), supra note
8, and Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2. The American Supreme Court split in several ways in Ashcroft,
supra note 3, and as noted in Williams, supra note 55, four United States circuits upheld possession
and pandering provisions of the CPPA, whereas the 91 Circuit, in the decision that was upheld by the
majority of the Supreme Court in Ashcroft, struck them down.
115. Ashcroft, supra note 3 at 251.
116. Meeting 26, supra note 17 at 9:15.
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Its message with regards to children is characterized as a self-contained
wrong, independent of the manner of production or use of the material., 17
The majority takes a less explicit view, simply adding together the various
major justifications in support of s. 163.1(1993):
Possession of child pornography increases the risk of child abuse. It
introduces risk, moreover, that cannot be entirely targeted by laws
prohibiting the manufacture, publication and distribution of child
pornography. Laws against publication and distribution of child
pornography cannot catch the private viewing of child pornography, yet
private viewing may induce attitudes and arousals that increase the risk
of offence. Nor do such laws catch the use of pornography to groom
and seduce children. Only by extending the law to private possession
can these harms be squarely attacked."'
Implicit in this arithmetic is a lesser version of the argument of Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6, that possession offences can bejustified by the reasonable
apprehension of harm to children generally. 9 This type of harm does not
have to be directly connected to abuse of children, and for this reason the
Canadian Supreme Court endorses inclusion of material that could not
conceivably be prohibited under the American constitutional regime, such
as self-created written works. It is noteworthy, however, that the liberal
interpretation of the "artistic merit" defence, to some extent, reversed this
broad inclusion, although the onus to demonstrate the material has value is
shifted to the accused. Borovoy criticizes this back-end approach to free-
speech protection; noting the significant ordeal and stigma of being tried
for child pornography, he indicates that "only a lawyer can be consoled by
the ultimate outcome of a case.'
' 20
5. Dialogue theory
In Canada it is almost axiomatic that a discussion of the interplay of
courts and legislatures consider the issue in the context of dialogue theory.
"Dialogue theory" in Canada can be traced to an often cited paper by
117. Sharpe (S.C.C.), supra note 2.
118. Ibid. at para. 94.
119. The concept of harm from obscenity negatively affecting society as a whole is reflected in Butler
supra note 27, and harm to society is a central concern of the harm-based test for adult indecency in
Labaye, supra note 28.
120. Meeting 26, supra note 17 at 9:40. Note that in this meeting reference is made to the well-known
Eli Langer case, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Langer (1995), 123 D.L.R. (4th) 289, 97 C.C.C. (3d)
290. In Meeting 29, supra note 17, Frank Addario appeared as a witness for the Canadian Conference
of the Arts. Mr. Addario had been counsel for Mr. Langer and he gives an overview of the case and
describes its impact on Mr. Langer. Mr. Langer is also cited as an example, with regard to the "chilling
effect" of child pornography law on art, by Charles Montpetit, Responsable of the Committee for the
Freedom of Speech, Union des dcrivaines et des dcrivains qudb~cois.
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Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell (now Thornton).'2' The basic concept is
that court judgments are not simply orders to be obeyed because they are
open to modification and reversal by legislatures.'22 Hogg and Thornton
argued that in most cases where the Supreme Court of Canada struck down
a law, legislatures responded with a new law.'23 There is thus a "dialogue"
between courts and legislatures. Kent Roach's book The Supreme Court On
Trial is a prominent example of Canadian perspectives on the concept of
"dialogue" between courts and legislatures. 2 4 Roach argues that dialogue
prevents judges from having American-style judicial supremacy, and
uses this contrast to assuage fears of judicial activism. He indicates that
the structure of the Canadian constitution, and particularly the Charter,
prevents the need to be concerned about the extent to which judges are
restrained or activist in interpreting the constitution:
[A]ppointing Dworkin's Hercules to the Court may not be as scary in
Canada... because judges under a modem bill of rights cannot enforce
their view of abstract moral principles as the final word, but must also
listen to government's justifications for limiting such rights. If Hercules
runs amuck, the legislature can enact ordinary legislation that overrides
or derogates from his interpretation of rights.'25
The basic assertion of dialogue theory in general, which is echoed by
Roach, is that there are two mechanisms available in Canada that allow
Parliament to converse with the courts about rights. Section 1 of the
Charter sets out that rights guarantees are "subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." Section 33 of the Charter allows legislatures to.
declare that an act or provision "shall operate notwithstanding a provision
included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter." Notwithstanding
declarations are subject to a five-year sunset clause.
Fully addressing the many critiques of dialogue theory is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, the amendments enacted with Bill C-2 relate
directly to the discussion of dialogue theory in Canada, as the response
to these amendments would represent the third in a line of legislative
121. Peter W. Hogg & Allison Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or
Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75.
122. Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Thornton, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures"
in Paul Howe & Peter H. Russell, eds., Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy (Montreal &
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press for The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2001)
106.
123. Ibid. at 110.
124. Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2001).
125. Ibid. at 234.
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responses to Supreme Court decisions on controversial issues. The other
important "dialogues" are represented by R v. 0 'Connor [0 'Connor] and
R. v. Mills [Mills], sometimes referred to as the "rape shield" cases, and
two voting rights cases brought by the same complainant, Mr. Sauve.
O'Connor and Mills dealt with disclosure of private records of
complainants in sexual abuse cases. 2 6 The "dialogue" issue was that
the four-judge dissent in O'Connor was adopted into legislation by
Parliament, and when it was challenged in Mills, the Court upheld the
legislation. 127 Professor Roach and others have held out the decision in
Mills as supporting dialogue, quoting the Court's statement that courts do
not
hold a monopoly on the protection and promotion of rights and freedoms;
Parliament also plays a role in this regard and is often able to act as a
significant ally for vulnerable groups. ... If constitutional democracy is
meant to ensure that due regard is given to the voices of those vulnerable
to being overlooked by the majority, then this court has an obligation to
consider respectfully Parliament's attempt to respond to such voices. 28
However, the deference shown to Parliament in Mills is clearly of a very
limited type, as the Court clarified in the later case of Sauv v. Canada
(Chief Electoral Officer) [Sauv 2002]. 129
Briefly, the Court in the previous case brought by Mr. Sauv6 struck
down, as a violation of the s.3 Charter right to vote, a provision in the
Canada Elections Act which prevented individuals detained by the state
from voting. Parliament responded to this decision by amending the
section to disenfranchise only prisoners serving more than two years.
This less severe provision came before the Court in Sauv 2002, and was
also struck down. Writing for the majority of the Court McLachlin C.J.
indicated that:
the core democratic rights of Canadians do not fall within a "range of
acceptable alternatives" among which Parliament may pick and choose
at its discretion. Deference may be appropriate on a decision involving
competing social and political policies. It is not appropriate, however,
on a decision to limit fundamental rights. 30
The Chief Justice was clear that rights interpretation is exclusive to the
Court. McLachlin C.J. further noted that:
126. R. v. O'Connor, [199514 S.C.R. 411, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 235.
127. R v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 at para. 22.
128. Ibid. at para. 58; quoted by Roach, supra note 124 at 280.
129. Sauv v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519.
130. Ibid. at para. 13.
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the fact that the challenged denial of the right to vote followed judicial
rejection of an even more comprehensive denial, does not mean that the
Court should defer to Parliament as part of a "dialogue". Parliament
must ensure that whatever law it passes, at whatever stage of the process,
conforms to the Constitution. The healthy and important promotion of a
dialogue between the legislature and the courts should not be debased to
a rule of 'if at first you don't succeed, try, try again." 3
The potential parallel in the sequence of the provisions dealing with child
pornography is too obvious to be omitted. Given the Court's indications
in Sauv, 2002, the argument advanced by Roach, prior to that case,
that Canada does not have American-style judicial review, is seriously
undermined. I will thus proceed on the basis that Canada and the United
States do not have significantly different rdgimes ofjudicial review. On this
premise, it is reasonable to compare and contrast the merits of judicial as
opposed to legislative decision-making on the issue of child pornography
in the two countries.
6. Waldron and Dworkin
"Comparative Law demonstrates the relativity of our own national
systems, and deconstructs the myth of right answers."'32 This sentiment
with regard to the mutual influence of international private law is equally
salient in constitutional law, particularly in the context of the United States
and Canada. The concept of the myth of right answers is related to the
argument advanced by Jeremy Waldron that disagreement is inevitable in
society, which is one of the foundations on which he builds a sophisticated
critique of judicial review. Reasonable individuals, be they judges,
lawmakers, or paupers, will disagree not only about what represents justice
in the context of the law generally, but will disagree fundamentally on
the meaning and scope of basic rights. This requires, inevitably, a system
of authority for resolving disagreement. As Waldron quips, "Majoritarian
democracy is the theory of authority with which most of us are familiar,
but others include 'Toss a coin', 'Let the king decide', and 'Leave it to the
judges."" 33 The question of how to build and justify a legitimate theory of
authority has occupied legal philosophers for centuries, but the democratic
justification generally rests on a concept of popular participation as a
method of legitimization. Michelman provides a conception of democracy
along these lines, characterizing the system as an imperfect struggle which
nevertheless provides validity even for unjust laws, since they arise out of
13 1. Ibid. at para 17.
132. Martijn W. Hesselink, The New European Legal Culture (Deventer: Kluwer, 2001) at 52,
referencing the ideas of Horatia Muir Watt, co- director of the Centre for Comparative Law, University
of Paris.
133. Jeremy Waldron, "A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights" (1993) 13 Oxford J. Legal
Stud. 18 at 32 [Waldron, "Critique"].
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the best possible participatory procedure in striving for the ideal.'34 This
concept is important to Waldron's critique of judicial decision-making:
If a process is democratic and comes up with the correct result, it does
no injustice to anyone. But if the process is non-democratic, it inherently
and necessarily does an injustice, in its operation, to the participatory
aspirations of the ordinary citizen. And it does this injustice, tyrannizes
in this way, whether it comes up with the correct result or not. 35
Dworkin's justification for his central disagreement with Waldron-
that society does sometimes need to "leave it to the judges"-rests on
a different foundation for the concept of membership in society. He
posits a need for "moral membership," which requires more than simple
participation, because participation can only be premised on certain
relational preconditions in society. 36 These conditions include such things
as universal suffrage, bona fide concern for other members, and, as is
relevant in the current discussion, free speech.'3 7 The conditions cannot
arise from a vacuum, and might not necessarily arise from majoritarian
decision-making. Dworkin thus suggests that liberty is not sacrificed
when the majoritarian premise is ignored, but rather enhanced when it is
"rejected outright in favour of a constitutional conception of democracy."' 38
Michelman has admitted the fundamental difficulty of democracy in
accounting for the existence of these relational preconditions. 3 9 However,
attacking along different lines, Waldron points out a similar inconsistency
at the foundation of rights-based theories of authority. These theories have
difficulty reconciling an inherent conflict: rights of liberty are premised on
individuals as rational, moral agents considerate of the rights of others, yet
a rights theory supporting judicial review posits that the same individuals,
in aggregate, represent the potential tyranny of the majority.140
This debate cannot be resolved in the context of child pornography.
However, the survey of this issue in Canada and the United States is
useful for more than simply pointing out jurisprudential differences and
highlighting that there is no objectively "right" answer to the balance
between protecting freedom of expression and protecting children from
134. Frank Michelman, "How Can the People Ever Make the Laws? A Critique of Deliberative
Democracy" in James Bohman & William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1997) 145.
135. Waldron, "Critique," supra note 133 at 50.
136. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom 's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) at 24.
137. Ibid. at 24-25.
138. Ibid. at 24.
139. Michelman, supra note 134.
140. Waldron, Disagreement, supra note 5 at 14.
404 The Dalhousie Law Journal
harm. The legislative responses to the decisions in Ashcrofi and Sharpe
(S.C.C.) are not unreasoned or unreasonable. However, they do relate to
the debate between majoritarianism and judicial review.
In all of the several hundred pages of testimony before the Justice
Committee, only a few arguments were made against the expansion of
the child pornography provisions. Artists' groups submitted that the
removal of the artistic merit defence could have a "chilling" effect on
artistic expression, and the Canadian and British Columbia Civil Liberties
Associations similarly advanced concerns that the provisions would
capture legitimate speech. 141 As was noted, the argument that sexual speech
should be protected if only because it is subversive was not canvassed.
With regard to legislative deliberation on the grander scale, it is
significant that Bill C-2 passed in the House of Commons without any
debate about whether the amendments were necessary---or any critique
except that they were too soft on pedophiles. Mr. Joe Comartin (Windsor-
Tecumseh, NDP), suggested that the "legitimate purpose" and "undue
risk of harm" test would be unclear and impractical, but was concerned
only because, having practised as a criminal lawyer, he felt the provision
was "ideal for the criminal defence bar."' 142 After being considered by
the Justice Committee-which amended Bill C-2 with respect to child
pornography to add mandatory minimum sentences for all offences,
including possession-the Bill passed in the House of Commons by
agreement of all parties, and a third reading was waived.'43 It received
short consideration in the Canadian Senate, with only a few words being
spoken in support of the Bill.' The PROTECT Act received similar
treatment in the United States. Tabled in the U.S. Senate, it passed 84-0.
The House of Representatives made non-substantial changes, and there it
passed 400-25, following which the U.S. Senate accepted the amendments
98-0. No major debate was engaged in, and the minor issues that arose
were resolved in committee. 45
The complete failure to debate a potentially significant issue of free
speech seems a prima facie failure of legislatures as the ideal forum for
141. Supra note 17: CCLA in Meeting 26; BCCLA in Meeting 27.
142. House of Commons Debates, No. 007 (13 October 2004) at 15:50 (Joe Comartin).
143. <http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO/index.asp?List=ls&Query=4199&session= 13&Language
=e>.
144. Debates of the Senate (Hansard), Vol. 142, Issue 70 (14 June 2005) [First Reading]; Vol. 142,
Issue 73 (20 June 2005) [Second Reading]; Vol. 142, Issue 84 (19 July 2005) [Third Reading]. See also
"Committee Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs," 38'
Parliament, I Session, 22 June 2005 and 23 June 2005, Vol. 142, No.17, online: <http://www.parl.
gc.ca/38/l/parlbus/cornmbus/senate/Com-e/lega-e/17cv-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=38&Ses=l &com
m id=l 1>.
145. PROTECTAct, 2003, supra note 4.
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balancing rights claims. Michelman concedes that democracy in practice
can only strive for an ideal which can never be reached,'46 and recognizing
such gloomy examples of legislative one-sidedness, Waldron argues that
the imperfections of democracy cannot justify another theory of authority
which is equally flawed, such as judicial review.147 Rejecting the prospect
of the tyranny of the majority, Waldron notes that underlying his theory is
his hope, what he calls the "aspirational quality" of his normative theory
of law, that citizens and representatives "do vote on the basis of good faith
and relatively impartial opinions about justice, rights, and the common
good."' 48 He convincingly argues that the level of cynicism required to
truly believe that individuals only ever act in their own self-interest is
ultimately defeating of any decision-making process, and is not a fair
critique of democratic decision-making. 49
The child pornography example does not undermine this fundamental
hope and does not show that legislative representatives act only in their
own, or their constituents', self-interest, but it does suggest that Dworkin
is correct that, on some issues, there is a tyranny of the majority. A lack of
debate does not indicate a lack of good faith or inability to act selflessly, and
the lawmakers in Canada and the United States were acting in the utmost
good faith: the legislative response to court decisions sought to increase
the emphasis on protecting children from harm. However, the discussion
of the various arguments advanced with regard to child pornography
shows that there is no objectively correct balance between free expression
and the protection of children. The differences of opinion between the
judges in both jurisdictions and between jurisdictions highlight this. What
the child pornography issue demonstrates is that there are some issues
that make it impossible, politically, for legislators to argue both sides of
a rights debate.
In the legislative responses considered here, legislators showed an
utter indifference to the rights concerns that were considered in detail by
the Canadian and U.S. courts. Dr. John Dixon (Vice-President, British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association), in his testimony to the Justice
Committee, gave an impassioned presentation on the general "ignorance"
of the public as to the meaning and fine distinctions of the law on child
pornography. 150 Although Waldron's confidence in the ability of citizens
and their representatives to act in more than bare self-interest is inspiring
146. Michelman, supra note 134.
147. Waldron, "Critique," supra note 133 at 45.
148. Waldron, Disagreement, supra note 5 at 14.
149. Waldron, "Critique," supra note 133 at 36.
150. Meeting 27, supra note 17 at 9:00.
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and, in this context at least, supportable, it may still be that they are
not capable of acting without a form of other-disregard. Pedophiles are
precisely the kind of group that push the boundaries of the democratic
model forwarded by theorists such as Michelman and Waldron and seem
to require the protections Dworkin advances, because they are so easily
disregarded.
The legislative amendments of Bill C-2 and the PROTECT Act
are carefully and reasonably tailored to the debates occurring in their
respective jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the scope of the legislation was
not restricted by reasonable debate amongst legislators concerning the
interests involved, but by the limits set by judicial debate. Cracking down
on child pornography sells well, and protecting free speech in this particular
context is not a popular argument. This is not to suggest that pedophiles
are an unfairly oppressed minority who must be protected by judges. 5'
Rather, the example serves to suggest that democratic representatives are
unable to reasonably argue regarding the extent to which pedophiles may
be fairly oppressed in, to use the Canadian language, a free and democratic
society.
Conclusion
"The vibrancy of a democracy is apparent by how wisely it navigates
through those critical junctures where state action intersects with, and
threatens to impinge upon, individual liberties."' 5 2 To extend Iacobucci J.'s
comment, I would suggest that Parliament and Congress could have been
more attentive in fine-tuning the balance drawn between protecting children
and freedom of expression. At least in the context of child pornography,
it may be argued that, despite the fundamental flaws of judicial review,
there are situations where judges are indeed useful in taking a more
balanced and principled approach in maintaining the conditions for liberty.
However, even the extremes of the Canadian dissent of L'Heureux-Dub6
J. in Sharpe (S. C. C.) and the American dissent of Brennan J. in Osborne
are far removed from the sort of free-speech provisions that lead down
the road to a police state. Neither position, if it were the majority, would
tarnish democracy. The American Supreme Court continues to approve of
the familiar adage: sticks and stones may break my bones, but names can
never hurt me. The Canadian Supreme Court may be beginning to disagree,
positing that certain speech content is itself morally and psychologically
harmful to individuals and society. This foundation in Canada permits
151. Although this argument exists: see Harris Mirkin, "The Pattern of Sexual Politics: Feminism,
Homosexuality and Pedophilia" (1999) 37:2 J. of Homosexuality 1.
152. R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 at para. 15.
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the view that content is fairly restricted where there is a reasonably
apprehended connection to harm to individuals, particularly children. The
result of comparing child pornography possession law in the United States
and Canada seems to be that the American Court finds the free speech
slope more slippery than the Canadian Court, and neither Congress nor
Parliament are particularly adept skiers.
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Appendix I
s. 163.1 Child Pornography Provisions, 1993 and 2005
R.S. 1985, c.C-46; 1993, c. 46, s. 2; 2002,
c. 13, s. 5.
163.1 (1) In this section, "child
pornography" means
(a) a photographic, film, video or
other visual representation,
whether or not it was made by
electronic or mechanical means,
(i) that shows a person who
is or is depicted as being
under the age of eighteen
years and is engaged in or
is depicted as engaged in
explicit sexual activity, or
(ii) the dominant characteristic
of which is the depiction,
for a sexual purpose, of a
sexual organ or the anal
region of a person under the
age of eighteen years; or
(b) any written material or visual
representation that advocates or
counsels sexual activity with a
person under the age of eighteen
years that would be an offence
under this Act.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, s.163.1, as
am. by S.C. 2005, c.32.
(Canada Gazette vol. 28, no. 48, 12 September
2005)
163.1 (1) In this section, "child pornography"
means
(a) a photographic, film, video or other
visual representation, whether or
not it was made by electronic or
mechanical means,
(i) that shows a person who is
or is depicted as being under
the age of eighteen years and
is engaged in or is depicted
as engaged in explicit sexual
activity, or
(ii) the dominant characteristic
of which is the depiction, for
a sexual purpose, of a sexual
organ or the anal region of
a person under the age of
eighteen years;
(b) any written material, visual
representation or audio recording
that advocates or counsels sexual
activity with a person under the age
of eighteen years that would be an
offence under this Act;
(c) any written material whose dominant
characteristic is the description,
for asexual purpose, of sexual
activity with a person under the age
of eighteen years that would be an
offence under this Act; or
(d) any audio recording that has
as its dominant characteristic
the description, presentation or
representation, for a sexual purpose,
of sexual activity with a person under
the age of eighteen years that would
be an offence under this Act.
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163. 1(2):
(2) Every person who makes, prints,
publishes or possesses for the purpose of
publication any child pornography is guilty
of
(a) an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding ten years; or
(b) an offence punishable on
summary conviction.
161.1(3) Every person who transmits, makes
available, distributes, sells, imports, exports
or possesses for the purpose of transmission,
making available, distribution, sale or
exportation any child pornography is guilty
of
(a) an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding ten years; or
(b) an offence punishable on
summary conviction.
(a) an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding ten years and
to a minimum punishment of
imprisonment for a term of one year;
or
(b) an offence punishable on
summary conviction and liable
to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding eighteen months and
to a minimum punishment of
imprisonment for a term of ninety
days.
161.1(3) Every person who transmits, makes
available, distributes, sells, advertises, imports,
exports or possesses for the purpose of
transmission, making available, distribution,
sale, advertising or exportation any child
pornography is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding ten years and
to a minimum punishment of
imprisonment for a term of one year;
or
(b) an offence punishable on
summary conviction and liable
to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding eighteen months and
to a minimum punishment of
imprisonment for a term of ninety
days.
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163.1(4) Every person who possesses any
child pornography is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on
summary conviction.
163.1(4.1) Every person who accesses any
child pornography is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on
summary conviction.
163.1(4.3) is added
(a) an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding five years and
to a minimum punishment of
imprisonment for a term offorty-five
days; or
(b) an offence punishable on
summary conviction and liable
to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding eighteen months and
to a minimum punishment of
imprisonment for a term offourteen
days.
(a) an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding five years and
to a minimum punishment of
imprisonment for a term offorty-five
days; or
(b) an offence punishable on
summary conviction and liable
to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding eighteen months and
to a minimum punishment of
imprisonment for a term offourteen
days.
(4.3) If a person is convicted of an offence under
this section, the court that imposes the sentence
shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact
that the person committed the offence with intent
to make a profit.
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163.1(6) and (7):
(6) Where the accused is charged with
an offence under subsection (2), (3), (4)
or (4.1), the court shall find the accused
not guilty if the representation or written
material that is alleged to constitute child
pornography has artistic merit or an
educational, scientific or medical purpose.
(7) Subsections 163(3) to (5) apply, with
such modifications as the circumstances
require, with respect to an offence under
subsection (2), (3), (4) or (4.1).
(6) No person shall be convicted of an offence
under this section if the act that is alleged to
constitute the offence
(a) has a legitimate purpose related to
the administration ofjustice or to
science, medicine, education or art;
and
(b) does not pose an undue risk of harm
to persons under the age of eighteen
years.
(7) For greater certainty, for the purposes of
this section, it is a question of law whether any
written material, visual representation or audio
recording advocates or counsels sexual activity
with a person under the age of eighteen years
that would be an offence under this Act.

